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THE “WHIP HAND”:  CONGRESS’S ELECTIONS 
CLAUSE POWER AS THE LAST HOPE FOR 
REDISTRICTING REFORM AFTER RUCHO 
Kevin Wender* 
 
Redistricting activists have long argued that partisan gerrymandering 
poses a fundamental threat to American democracy.  These concerns have 
become particularly acute as increasingly sophisticated technologies have 
enabled legislators to draw highly gerrymandered maps that powerfully 
entrench partisan advantage.  Despite these concerns, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in the 2019 case of Rucho v. Common Cause, declared partisan 
gerrymandering to be a political issue outside the purview of the federal 
courts.  The decision dealt a major blow to redistricting activists who, for 
over fifty years, had hoped that the Court would intervene to combat the 
drawing of electoral districts for partisan gain. 
This Note examines and evaluates the possible avenues for comprehensive 
redistricting reform in the aftermath of Rucho.  While recognizing some 
recent successes, this Note analyzes how state-level redistricting remedies 
face significant constitutional and political barriers that would likely prevent 
comprehensive reform.  Furthermore, this Note argues that the Elections 
Clause gives Congress strong constitutional authority to enact nationwide 
anti-gerrymandering legislation, and that this power under the Elections 
Clause represents the last hope for achieving comprehensive redistricting 
reform.  Finally, this Note proposes legislation that would require states to 
adopt independent redistricting commissions for congressional elections 
while allowing states to choose their own criteria and electoral priorities to 
govern the redistricting process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Asheville, North Carolina, a small college town of approximately 90,000 
people, is a relatively liberal enclave in a relatively conservative and rural 
part of North Carolina.1  As a result of this roughly even Republican-
Democrat split, Western North Carolina’s Eleventh Congressional District 
was historically one of the most competitive congressional districts in the 
South, frequently flipping between Democratic and Republican 
 
 1. See Joanna Walters, Gerrymander 5K:  Run Highlights Absurdity of Republican 
Redistricting, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/nov/05/gerrymander-5k-run-asheville-north-carolina-republicans 
[https://perma.cc/T9C5-K99J]. 
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representatives.2  The toss-up nature of the district meant that it was often 
represented by politically moderate candidates, such as Heath Shuler, a 
former NFL quarterback and fiscally conservative, centrist Democrat who 
represented the district beginning in 2007.3  However, the competitive nature 
of the Eleventh Congressional District dramatically changed in 2011, when 
the Republican-controlled state legislature redrew North Carolina’s 
congressional districts.4  The result was that Asheville was divided into two 
congressional districts, with some of its residents lumped into the Tenth 
Congressional District and the rest in the Eleventh.5  The new districts 
dramatically split Asheville, such that a section of the newly formed 
congressional boundary bisected dormitories at the University of North 
Carolina Asheville, meaning that students living on different sides of the 
same dorm now had different representatives in Congress.6 
The two redrawn congressional districts both included large amounts of 
rural, conservative voters who greatly outnumbered progressive voters in 
Asheville.7  Overnight, state legislators transformed the Eleventh District 
from a toss-up district to an overwhelmingly conservative one.8  In 2012, 
Shuler was unseated by Mark Meadows, one of the most conservative 
members of the House of Representatives and the future chair of the 
staunchly conservative House Freedom Caucus.9  This practice of dispersing 
voters of one political party into several congressional districts in order to 
dilute their voting power has become a commonplace redistricting practice 
across state legislatures in the United States.10  Furthermore, increasingly 
sophisticated technologies have ushered in a new era of extreme partisan 
 
 2. See Richard Fausset, With No Supreme Court End to Gerrymandering, Will States 
Make It More Extreme?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/ 
28/us/supreme-court-gerrymandering-north-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/5X7B-ED6P]. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Walters, supra note 1.  North Carolina’s map for congressional districts remains 
subject to ongoing litigation and legislative debate.  In September, a North Carolina state court 
struck down the gerrymandered map as violating the state’s constitution. See Common Cause 
v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, 2019 WL 4569584, at *112 (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019).  
In response, the Republican-led North Carolina Senate approved a new, slightly less 
gerrymandered map.  However, North Carolina Democrats plan to challenge the map in court 
again. See Brian Murphy, North Carolina Lawmakers OK New 2020 Congressional Maps.  
Now It’s Up to the Courts., NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2019, 3:45 PM), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article237398119.html 
[https://perma.cc/7XVF-5CAY]. 
 6. Fausset, supra note 2. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Jane C. Timm, They’re Still Drawing Crazy-Looking Districts.  Can’t It Be 
Stopped?, NBC NEWS (Sept. 22, 2017, 2:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/ 
elections/they-re-still-drawing-crazy-looking-districts-can-t-it-n803051 [https://perma.cc/ 
T2JK-J3QP]. 
 10. See J. Gerald Hebert & Marina K. Jenkins, The Need for State Redistricting Reform 
to Rein in Partisan Gerrymandering, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 543, 544 (2010); see also 
Emily Bazelon, The New Front in the Gerrymandering Wars:  Democracy vs. Math, N.Y. 
TIMES MAG. (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/29/magazine/the-new-front-
in-the-gerrymandering-wars-democracy-vs-math.html [https://perma.cc/U8J9-ATPQ]. 
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gerrymandering by enabling legislators to draw hyperfocused maps that split 
individual neighborhoods, blocks, and homes.11 
These kinds of extreme partisan gerrymanders have had a corrosive effect 
on American democracy by decreasing competitive elections, entrenching 
partisan power in a way that is unrepresentative of the electorate, and diluting 
the franchise of a large number of voters solely because of their party 
affiliation.12  These concerns are more pressing than ever with the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause,13 which declared 
partisan gerrymandering to be a nonjusticiable political question and thereby 
effectively foreclosed the federal judiciary as an avenue for achieving 
redistricting reform.14 
This Note will evaluate the options for comprehensive redistricting reform 
in the aftermath of Rucho.  Part I of this Note provides an overview of 
redistricting and partisan gerrymandering, including the evolution of the 
Supreme Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence.  Part II details the 
possible options for redistricting reform after Rucho and the political and 
constitutional barriers that each option faces.  Finally, Part III argues that 
Congress’s power to enact nationwide election law under the Elections 
Clause is the only remedy that can achieve comprehensive redistricting 
reform, and it proposes legislation that would require states to adopt 
independent redistricting commissions for congressional elections. 
I.  PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING:  A PRIMER 
Part I of this Note provides background on the redistricting process and 
the history of partisan gerrymandering.  Part I.A discusses the constitutional 
standards for legislative redistricting.  Part I.B addresses the mechanics of 
partisan gerrymandering and how partisan gerrymandering undermines 
democratic values.  Part I.C summarizes the evolution of the Supreme 
Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence, culminating with the Court’s 
recent holding in Rucho that partisan gerrymandering claims are 
nonjusticiable political questions. 
A.  Legislative Districting 
The Constitution requires Congress to conduct an “actual Enumeration” 
every ten years to determine the population of the United States.15  Based on 
 
 11. Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 10, at 552; see also Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. 
Ct. 2484, 2512–13 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“These are not your grandfather’s—let 
alone the Framers’—gerrymanders.”). 
 12. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 
59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2145–47 (2018); see also Devin Caughey et al., Partisan 
Gerrymandering and the Political Process:  Effects on Roll-Call Voting and State Policies, 16 
ELECTION L.J. 453, 457–58 (2017) (analyzing partisan gerrymandering and the ideological 
skew of state legislatures). 
 13. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 14. See id. at 2506–07; see also infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the facts and holding of 
Rucho). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
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the results of the decennial census, Congress then reapportions the number 
of seats in the House of Representatives, with each state entitled to at least 
one representative.16  In most states, state legislators are then responsible for 
drawing new congressional and state legislative district maps that reflect 
state-level population shifts over the past decade.17  These new maps must 
contain districts with roughly equal populations in order to satisfy the “one 
person, one vote” requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.18  
Additionally, new maps must satisfy minority representation requirements 
outlined in section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).19 
B.  Partisan Gerrymandering 
This section provides an overview of how legislators create partisan 
gerrymanders and how they have recently utilized new mapping technologies 
to draw increasingly precise and effective gerrymanders.  Furthermore, this 
section discusses the various ways in which partisan gerrymandering 
undermines democratic values. 
1.  The Rise of Extreme Partisan Gerrymandering 
Partisan gerrymandering occurs when a majority party in a state legislature 
manipulates the boundaries of electoral districts to maximize partisan 
advantage.20  A party in control of the redistricting process can entrench its 
own power by ensuring the election or reelection of its own members while 
decreasing the political safety of party opponents.21  This is done by 
“packing,” moving voters from the opposition party into only a few districts, 
or “cracking,” splitting a population that would otherwise produce a majority 
into minority portions in other districts.22  Partisan gerrymandering results in 
 
 16. Id. amend. XIV, § 2, cl. 1 (“Representatives shall be apportioned among the several 
States according to their respective numbers . . . .”); see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Number 
of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have 
at Least one Representative . . . .”). 
 17. See L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44798, CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING LAW:  BACKGROUND AND RECENT COURT RULINGS 2 (2017), https:// 
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44798 [https://perma.cc/823Z-X853]. 
 18. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 
368, 381 (1963)). 
 19. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10303(f) (2018); see also Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 
30, 50–51 (1986) (establishing a three-pronged test for vote dilution under section 2 of the 
VRA).  Until 2013, the Court construed section 5 of the VRA to require states covered under 
section 4(b) of the VRA to obtain approval and preclearance for any proposed change to a 
voting law, including changes to redistricting maps. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
905–06 (1995).  To obtain preclearance, a state covered under section 4(b) had the burden of 
proving that the proposed map had neither the purpose nor effect of denying or abridging the 
right to vote on account of race or color. See 52 U.S.C. § 10304.  In 2013, the Court invalidated 
sections 4(b) and 5, holding that the application of the coverage formula violated the 
fundamental principle of equal sovereignty among the states without justification. See Shelby 
County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013). 
 20. Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 10, at 544. 
 21. See id. 
 22. See id. 
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a large number of uncompetitive “safe” districts for the representatives of the 
party in control of the redistricting process.23 
Partisan gerrymandering’s roots in American politics can be traced to the 
early nineteenth century.24  However, the emergence of sophisticated 
mapping and data aggregation technologies has led to a recent escalation in 
the frequency and effectiveness of partisan gerrymandering, while also 
nearly guaranteeing compliance with the “one person, one vote” requirement 
of the Equal Protection Clause and the minority representation requirements 
of the VRA.25  These new technological tools were at the heart of the 
Redistricting Majority Project (REDMAP), an aggressive campaign of 
sophisticated gerrymandering that the Republican National Committee 
(RNC) implemented in advance of the round of redistricting following the 
2010 census.26  REDMAP was enormously successful, helping Republicans 
achieve new gerrymandered majorities in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.27  More importantly, REDMAP initiated a 
new era of American politics where partisan gerrymandering has now 
become a multimillion-dollar enterprise with armies of lawyers, consultants, 
and data scientists all working to maximize partisan advantage for both 
parties by weaponizing the redistricting process.28 
2.  How Partisan Gerrymandering Corrodes Democracy 
Extreme partisan gerrymandering raises key questions about democracy as 
gerrymandered districts lead to less competitive elections, more polarized 
elected officials, and decreased rates of voter registration and participation.29  
Another consequence of partisan gerrymandering is that the ideological 
views of legislators are deeply unrepresentative of the electorate that they 
claim to represent.30  For example, at a statewide level, North Carolina is a 
toss-up, “purple” state with highly contested elections and an almost even 
split of Democratic and Republican voters.31  However, North Carolina 
 
 23. Bazelon, supra note 10. 
 24. The term “gerrymandering” was coined in 1812 after the governor of Massachusetts, 
Elbridge Gerry, created a salamander-shaped electoral district to maintain majority control. 
See Michael Wines, What Is Gerrymandering?:  And Why Did the Supreme Court Rule on It?, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/27/us/what-is-
gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/P8SM-M5TR]. 
 25. Hebert & Jenkins, supra note 10, at 552. 
 26. See generally DAVID DALEY, RATF**KED:  THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE SECRET PLAN 
TO STEAL AMERICA’S DEMOCRACY (2016) (documenting the origin and implementation of 
REDMAP throughout the United States). 
 27. See David Daley, How the GOP Made Your Vote Useless, DAILY BEAST (Oct. 7, 
2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-gop-gerrymandering-made-your-democratic-
vote-useless [https://perma.cc/4ZKK-HUV5]. 
 28. See Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arms Race, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/ 
gerrymandering-technology-redmap-2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/8JCA-WX5G]. 
 29. Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 2118–20. 
 30. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Thomas Wolf & Peter Miller, How Gerrymandering Kept Democrats from 
Winning Even More Seats Tuesday, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2018), 
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Republicans were able to secure supermajorities in the state legislature, as 
well as a nearly untouchable 10-3 advantage in the state’s congressional 
delegation by securing unilateral control over the map-drawing process 
before the last round of redistricting in 2010.32  Despite the politically 
moderate makeup of the state’s electorate, North Carolina Republicans 
capitalized on their resulting statewide political domination to enact some of 
the most extreme conservative legislation in the United States, including the 
Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (commonly known as “House Bill 
2”), which overturned local LGBTQ antidiscrimination statutes and 
prohibited transgender individuals from using bathrooms and locker rooms 
that aligned with their gender identities in public schools and government 
buildings.33 
The overall result of partisan gerrymandering is that gerrymandered maps 
that entrench Democratic power produce state and federal congressional 
delegations that are significantly more liberal than their states’ electorate.34  
Conversely, gerrymandered maps that entrench Republican power produce 
delegations that are significantly more conservative than their states’ 
electorate.35  In short, partisan gerrymandering poses a threat to a 
fundamental aspect of democracy, “that the voters should choose their 
representatives, not the other way around.”36  These democratic concerns are 
particularly acute now that the Supreme Court has upheld the 
constitutionality of extreme partisan gerrymandering by declaring partisan 
gerrymandering to be a nonjusticiable political question.37 
C.  The “Political Thicket”:  The Supreme Court’s Partisan 
Gerrymandering Jurisprudence 
In 1946, Justice Felix Frankfurter referred to redistricting as a “political 
thicket” that federal courts would do well to avoid.38  Despite Justice 




 32. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2509–10 (2019) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting). 
 33. 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 12 (repealed 2017); see also Ella Nilsen, North Carolina’s 
Extreme Gerrymandering Could Save the House Republican Majority, VOX (May 8, 2018, 
11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/8/17271766/north-carolina-
gerrymandering-2018-midterms-partisan-redistricting [https://perma.cc/W2YA-5ZZ7].  After 
widespread outcry from national business leaders and lawmakers, the Act was eventually 
repealed under Democratic Governor Roy Cooper. 
 34. Stephanopoulos, supra note 12, at 2120. 
 35. See id. 
 36. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 
(2015) (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 781 
(2005)). 
 37. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the facts and holding of Rucho). 
 38. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
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develop a standard for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering claims.39  This 
section provides an overview of the Court’s adjudication of constitutional 
challenges to the apportionment of legislative districts, which culminated in 
2019 with the landmark case of Rucho v. Common Cause.40 
1.  The Search for a “Judicially Discoverable and Manageable Standard”—
from Baker to LULAC 
The Supreme Court began to develop constitutional requirements for the 
drawing of congressional and state legislative district maps during the 
“reapportionment revolution” of the 1960s.41  In Baker v. Carr,42 Tennessee 
voters argued that the use of a district map that apportioned representatives 
according to sixty-year-old demographic data from the 1900 federal census, 
regardless of the substantial shifts in Tennessee’s population, violated their 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights “by virtue of the debasement 
of their votes.”43  The Court held that the equal protection right against vote 
dilution asserted by the plaintiffs was justiciable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.44  Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan explained 
that justiciability exists where “the duty asserted can be judicially identified 
and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right 
asserted can be judicially molded.”45  Shortly after Baker, the Court 
elaborated on the meaning of an equal protection right against vote dilution, 
holding that congressional and state legislative districts must be equal in 
population under the “one person, one vote” standard.46 
Despite the promise of the Court’s reapportionment revolution, the Court 
has never struck down a district map as an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander.47  For over three decades, the Court failed to agree on a 
“judicially discoverable and manageable standard” for the adjudication of 
partisan gerrymandering claims before finally holding that partisan 
gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable political questions outside the 
Court’s jurisdiction.48 
 
 39. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 420 
(2006); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 185 n.25 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962). 
 40. 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
 41. See Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 
757 (2004). 
 42. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 43. Id. at 193–95. 
 44. See id. at 237. 
 45. Id. at 198. 
 46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964) (quoting Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 
381 (1963)). 
 47. See Adam Liptak, Justices to Hear Major Challenge to Partisan Gerrymandering, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/06/19/us/politics/justices-to-hear-
major-challenge-to-partisan-gerrymandering.html [https://perma.cc/ZYS8-F3U8]. 
 48. See infra notes 49–62, 78–80 and accompanying text. 
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In Davis v. Bandemer,49 the Supreme Court held that claims of 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering were justiciable under the Equal 
Protection Clause and subject to the one-person, one-vote principle.50  
However, the Court disagreed on the adoption of a manageable standard for 
adjudicating such claims.51  Justice Byron White, in a plurality opinion, 
wrote that in order to prevail in a partisan gerrymandering claim, plaintiffs 
must prove that a district map was drawn with the intent to discriminate 
against a political group and that the map actually had a discriminatory effect 
against that group.52  Justice White specified that unconstitutionality only 
occurs when elections are arranged in a manner that will “consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a 
whole.”53  Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s concurring opinion rejected the 
plurality’s intent-effect standard and contended that partisan gerrymandering 
claims were nonjusticiable.54 
The Supreme Court revisited the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering 
claims in 2004 in Vieth v. Jubelirer.55  Echoing Justice O’Connor’s 
Bandemer concurrence, the four-justice Vieth plurality would have overruled 
Bandemer and held that political gerrymandering claims are not justiciable 
because “no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating 
political gerrymandering claims have emerged.”56  However, Justice 
Anthony Kennedy’s fifth vote for the decision to dismiss kept the promise of 
justiciability for partisan gerrymandering claims alive.57  In his concurrence, 
Justice Kennedy refused to endorse a constitutional standard for the 
adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims but also declined to declare 
that partisan gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.58  Justice Kennedy 
contended that the fact that an appropriate standard had not yet emerged did 
not necessarily mean that no standard could emerge in the future.59  Just two 
years later, in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC),60 
Justice Kennedy again declined to either endorse a constitutional standard for 
partisan gerrymandering claims or declare partisan gerrymandering to be a 
 
 49. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 50. See id. at 123–25. 
 51. See id. at 185 n.25 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 52. See id. at 127 (plurality opinion). 
 53. Id. at 132. 
 54. See id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The Equal Protection Clause does not 
supply judicially manageable standards for resolving purely political gerrymandering claims, 
and no group right to an equal share of political power was ever intended by the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 55. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 56. Id. at 281. 
 57. See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); see also Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Kennedy’s Vote Is in Play on Voting 
Maps Warped by Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/10/03/us/ 
politics/gerrymandering-supreme-court-wisconsin.html [https://perma.cc/ZMX5-AR3M]. 
 58. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 317 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 59. See id. 
 60. 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
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nonjusticiable political question.61  As in Vieth, Justice Kennedy still 
believed that it was possible for the Court to identify a workable test that 
could determine when an electoral map crossed over from lawful partisanship 
to excessive partisanship.62 
2.  Rucho v. Common Cause:  The Supreme Court Closes the Door 
Justice Kennedy, whose fifth vote in Vieth and LULAC kept alive the 
possibility of a judicial remedy for partisan gerrymandering, retired in 2018.  
With Justice Kennedy replaced by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court finally 
ended decades of uncertainty on partisan gerrymandering with its decision in 
Rucho v. Common Cause.63  In Rucho, the Court considered whether 
congressional maps in North Carolina and Maryland were unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymanders.64  In North Carolina, the Republican-controlled state 
legislature adopted a heavily gerrymandered map that strongly favored North 
Carolina Republicans in the round of redistricting following the 2010 
census.65  Soon afterwards, in Cooper v. Harris,66 the Court struck down the 
map as an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.67  In drawing a new map, the 
Republican heads of the state’s redistricting committee hired Thomas 
Hofeller and instructed him to create an even more GOP-friendly map—by 
explicitly focusing on partisanship instead of race.68  Using sophisticated 
mapping software and detailed precinct-level election results to predict 
voting behavior, Hofeller drew district boundaries that he believed would 
ensure the continuous election of ten Republican congressmen.69  The new 
map worked exactly as planned.  In 2016, Republican congressional 
candidates won ten of North Carolina’s thirteen congressional seats, despite 
only receiving 53 percent of the statewide vote.70 
A similar series of events unfolded in Maryland’s redistricting process, 
except this time Democrats, not Republicans, adopted a heavily 
gerrymandered map that entrenched political power.71  Historically, 
Maryland’s eight-person congressional delegation consisted of two or three 
Republicans and five or six Democrats.72  However, after the 2010 census, 
Maryland Democratic leaders, who had total control of the state’s 
government, decided to manipulate district lines to maximize political 
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control at the expense of Republicans.73  Democratic Governor Martin 
O’Malley appointed Congressman Steny Hoyer, a self-described “serial 
gerrymanderer,” to spearhead the Maryland redistricting process.74  Using 
similar mapping technologies to those Hofeller utilized in North Carolina, 
Maryland Democrats produced a new map that they believed would produce 
seven Democratic seats and protect all Democratic incumbents.75  As in 
North Carolina, the gerrymander worked exactly as planned, with Democrats 
winning seven of eight congressional seats despite only receiving 65 percent 
of the statewide congressional vote.76 
Voting rights organizations and voters sued North Carolina and Maryland, 
alleging that the states’ maps for congressional districts constituted 
impermissible partisan gerrymanders.77  In a 5-4 decision, the Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that partisan gerrymandering claims 
are not justiciable because they present a political question beyond the reach 
of federal courts.78  In the majority opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts 
acknowledged that, while federal courts can “resolve a variety of questions 
surrounding districting,” it is beyond their power and competence to decide 
when partisan gerrymandering goes too far.79  Therefore, in the absence of 
any “limited and precise standard” for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering 
claims, the Court concluded that federal courts cannot resolve issues related 
to partisan gerrymandering.80 
II.  POSSIBLE OPTIONS FOR REDISTRICTING REFORM AFTER RUCHO 
In support of the Court’s ruling in Rucho, Chief Justice Roberts 
highlighted three possible alternatives for redistricting reform—state courts, 
the creation of independent redistricting commissions at the state level, and 
congressional legislation.81  Part II details these possible options for 
redistricting reform in the aftermath of Rucho.  This Part will address how 
the state-level gerrymandering remedies have political and constitutional 
barriers that would prevent systemic redistricting reform.  Part II.A discusses 
the adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims by state courts.  Part II.B 
discusses the creation of state independent redistricting commissions through 
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bipartisan legislation and direct voter referendums.  Part II.C discusses 
Congress’s authority to regulate federal elections under the Elections Clause, 
as well as several proposals for congressional anti-gerrymandering 
legislation. 
A.  State Courts 
Opponents of partisan gerrymandering have had some limited success in 
striking down gerrymandered maps in state courts in Florida, North Carolina, 
and Pennsylvania as violating their respective state’s constitutions.82  For 
example, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down the state legislature’s 
congressional districting plan as violating the “Fair Districts Amendment” to 
the Florida Constitution.83  Despite some limited victories in state courts for 
partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs, further success in state courts will likely 
be difficult to achieve unless a state constitution contains similar provisions 
through which a redistricting claim might be pursued.84  While partisan 
gerrymandering plaintiffs in Florida were able to pursue a claim through the 
state’s Fair Districts Amendment, most states do not have specific 
constitutional provisions aimed at promoting fair representation.85 
Furthermore, even if a state has a constitutional provision that is relevant 
to redistricting, success in state courts also requires that state supreme court 
judges are willing to rule against partisan gerrymandering.  This is especially 
problematic because state supreme court judges face some form of election 
in thirty-eight of the fifty states.86  In these states, it is very unlikely that 
partisan gerrymandering plaintiffs will receive favorable rulings since 
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elected judges are political actors who may often benefit from partisan 
gerrymandering.87 
Finally, even if plaintiffs succeed in convincing state judges to strike down 
gerrymandered maps as violating that state’s constitution, state courts will 
likely be unable to fundamentally change the state’s map-drawing process as 
courts may only strike down the most extremely gerrymandered maps.88  For 
example, after a state court in North Carolina struck down state legislative 
districts as discriminating against Democrats in violation of the state 
constitution, the state’s Republican-led legislature created new legislative 
districts that were only slightly less gerrymandered.89 
B.  Independent Redistricting Commissions 
In light of Rucho and the difficulties of ending gerrymandering through 
state courts, many states are turning to independent redistricting commissions 
(IRCs) as the most promising avenue for curbing partisan gerrymandering.90  
This section provides a brief overview of how states implement and regulate 
IRCs and the various political and constitutional challenges that state IRCs 
face. 
1.  Background 
State legislators have historically had the authority to draw electoral 
districts and this remains true in most states.91  However, an increasing 
number of states are transferring the map-drawing authority from legislators 
to nonpartisan IRCs.92  These commissions attempt to curb partisan 
gerrymandering by insulating the redistricting process from the political 
branches and giving the power over redistricting to an independent 
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commission.93  IRCs can either be created through bipartisan legislation that 
delegates the legislature’s map-drawing authority to an IRC or through direct 
voter referendums.94 
In both existing and proposed IRCs, there is a large degree of variability 
in the structure, design, and operation of IRCs.95  IRCs also use a number of 
different approaches and criteria to guide the members of the commissions 
during the map-drawing process.96  However, broadly, states have taken two 
basic approaches on how to instruct IRCs to create fair maps.  The first 
approach used by states is to either prioritize or limit the map-drawing criteria 
to nonpartisan political considerations.97  For example, California’s IRC is 
guided by criteria—established by referendum—that electoral districts be 
contiguous, compact, and regular in shape and respect local political 
boundaries and communities of interest to the furthest extent possible.98 
The second approach used by states explicitly focuses on achieving certain 
political outcomes, such that districts are drawn to promote competitive 
elections and each political party receives about the same percentage of seats 
as the percentage of votes it received.99  For example, Missouri’s recently 
approved IRC is instructed by statute to design legislative districts “in a 
manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, secondarily, 
competitiveness.”100  The statute explains that “‘[p]artisan fairness’ means 
parties shall be able to translate their popular support into legislative 
representation with approximately equal efficiency” and that 
“‘[c]ompetitiveness’ means that parties’ legislative representation shall be 
substantially and similarly responsive to shifts in the electorate’s 
preferences.”101 
Some states have employed a mix of the nonpartisan and partisan 
approaches.102  For example, Utah’s IRC is instructed to create districts 
“following natural and geographic features, boundaries, and barriers” to the 
greatest extent possible.103  The Utah commission is also instructed not to 
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“divide districts in a manner that purposefully or unduly favors or 
disfavors . . . any political party.”104 
2.  Recent Successes 
In Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission,105 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of IRCs 
created by voter referendums.106  Since Arizona State Legislature, many 
states have passed direct voter referendums that create IRCs, and several 
other bipartisan measures are underway to fix the map-drawing process 
ahead of the next round of redistricting in 2021.107  In the 2018 midterm 
election cycle, voters created IRCs through direct referendums in Colorado, 
Michigan, Missouri, and Utah.108  Furthermore, in light of Rucho and the 
lack of other viable avenues to curb gerrymandering, reformers and advocacy 
organizations aiming to create fair electoral maps have identified the creation 
of IRCs at the state level as one of the most promising avenues for 
redistricting reform.109 
However, despite some of the recent successes in creating IRCs at the state 
level, IRCs face significant political and constitutional barriers that make 
them an unlikely avenue for achieving nationwide redistricting reform. 
3.  Political Barriers 
The most significant recent efforts to create IRCs at the state level have 
been accomplished through direct voter initiatives.110  However, creating 
IRCs through direct voter initiatives is an inherently limited remedy for 
achieving nationwide redistricting reform, as only twenty-four states have 
the ability to pass legislation or constitutional amendments through direct 
voter referendums.111 
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In states without direct voter referendums, IRCs can only be created 
through bipartisan legislation that delegates the legislature’s map-drawing 
authority to an IRC.112  Yet, the creation of IRCs through bipartisan 
legislation is a near impossibility in gerrymandered legislatures.113  This is 
because many elected representatives maintain their offices through partisan 
gerrymandering and therefore have an incentive to perpetuate the practice.114  
Furthermore, because gerrymandering blunts voters’ preferences, anti-
gerrymandering voters would need to win a large supermajority of the vote 
to undo a gerrymandered legislature.115  In other words, once a legislature is 
gerrymandered, the introduction of bipartisan legislation creating IRCs is 
highly unlikely, given that IRCs undermine partisan gerrymandering’s chief 
aim of entrenching partisan advantage. 
The difficulty of creating IRCs through bipartisan legislation is highlighted 
by the fact that states that have created IRCs through direct referendums have 
only been able to do so in the face of intense opposition by state legislators.116  
For example, in Missouri, where voters recently approved a referendum that 
would turn redistricting over to an independent state demographer, members 
of the state legislature have already introduced legislation that would repeal 
the referendum.117  The experience in Missouri highlights how states that 
establish IRCs through direct referendum would likely be unable to do the 
same thing if the issue is left to the traditional legislative process.118 
4.  Uncertain Constitutional Status 
In addition to various political barriers, it is also unclear whether the 
Supreme Court will continue to uphold the constitutionality of IRCs created 
through direct referendums.119  While the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of IRCs created by voter referendums in Arizona State Legislature, it did so 
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by a narrow 5-4 majority and the now retired Justice Kennedy provided the 
fifth vote for the majority.120  At issue in Arizona State Legislature was 
whether the term “the legislature” in the U.S. Constitution’s Elections Clause 
precluded a state’s people from creating an IRC by direct referendum that 
operated independently of a state’s legislature.121  The Court concluded that 
the original public meaning of the Elections Clause and the Court’s own 
precedent supported interpreting the Clause as encompassing a state’s entire 
legislative process and not merely its legislative body.122  Furthermore, the 
Court explained that a state’s entire legislative process includes the people 
acting through the initiative process—through which the people can create 
IRCs.123  In a sharply worded dissent, Chief Justice Roberts criticized the 
majority, writing that their interpretation of the Elections Clause was “a 
magic trick . . . [that] has no basis in the text, structure, or history of the 
Constitution.”124 
Given the changed composition of the Court after the retirement of Justice 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts’s vigorous disagreement with the 
Arizona State Legislature decision, it is unclear whether the Court will 
continue to uphold the constitutionality of IRCs created by direct 
referendums.125  This major constitutional uncertainty, as well as the various 
political barriers discussed above, makes it unlikely that IRCs created at the 
state level can achieve comprehensive redistricting reform.126 
C.  Congressional Legislation 
Congress has broad constitutional authority pursuant to the Elections 
Clause to enact voting legislation and regulate federal congressional 
elections.127  Records from the ratification debates show that the framers 
understood the Elections Clause as giving Congress the ultimate authority to 
regulate federal elections and that this broad grant of power was necessary to 
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prevent partisan manipulation by the states.128  Furthermore, contemporary 
and historical Supreme Court doctrine has reaffirmed Congress’s unusually 
far-reaching constitutional authority to enact election law and clarified that 
this authority encompasses legislation setting how states must draw political 
maps for federal congressional elections.129 
1.  The Ratification Debates and the Original Public Understanding of the 
Elections Clause 
Records from the debates during the Constitutional Convention support 
the proposition that the framers intended the Elections Clause to protect 
federal elections from instances of state impropriety or inaction, which may 
include partisan gerrymandering.130  During the ratification debates at the 
1787 Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, some delegates objected to 
Congress’s wide-ranging authority under the proposed Elections Clause.131  
Most notably, Charles Pinckney and John Rutledge moved to completely 
remove Congress’s oversight power from the Elections Clause.132  Many 
delegates spoke against the Pinckney-Rutledge motion, arguing that electoral 
oversight is an essential power of a national government.133  In an extended 
speech, James Madison defended congressional electoral oversight as a 
necessary check on partisan manipulation of the election process by the 
states.134  Following Madison’s comments, the delegates declined to adopt 
the Pinckney-Rutledge motion and even inserted additional language to 
allow Congress to both make and alter election regulations.135 
The congressional oversight power in the Elections Clause remained a 
subject of debate during the state ratification conventions.136  Anti-federalists 
feared that Congress’s power under the Elections Clause would infringe on 
states’ rights and create too great a consolidation of federal power.137  
Echoing Madison’s comments at the Philadelphia convention, Federalists 
responded that the oversight power was necessary to counter state 
legislatures set on undermining fair representation through measures like 
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malapportionment.138  For example, in Massachusetts, delegates referenced 
recent efforts by the Rhode Island legislature to deprive developing 
population centers of their proper electoral weight as evidence that the 
congressional oversight power was needed to preserve the will of a majority 
of the people.139 
The framers could not foresee the rise of the national two-party system or 
how sophisticated mapping software could make it relatively easy to entrench 
partisan power.  However, the records from the ratification debates clearly 
show that the founders understood the Elections Clause as giving Congress 
the power to regulate federal elections, especially when Congress exercises 
this power in response to partisan manipulation by the states. 
2.  Judicial Interpretation of the Elections Clause 
The Supreme Court’s case law has reaffirmed Congress’s comprehensive 
and wide-ranging authority to regulate federal elections under the Elections 
Clause.140  While the Elections Clause gives Congress wide-ranging power 
to regulate the redistricting of federal congressional districts, this power does 
not extend to the regulation of state legislative districts.141 
The Court has consistently interpreted the Elections Clause as giving 
Congress wide-ranging power to regulate the redistricting of federal 
congressional districts.142  For example, in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
Arizona, Inc.,143 Justice Antonin Scalia—writing for a majority that included 
Chief Justice Roberts—held that “Times, Places, and Manner . . . are 
‘comprehensive words,’ which ‘embrace authority to provide a complete 
code for congressional elections.’”144  Furthermore, Justice Scalia explained 
that federal election regulations supersede any inconsistent state regulations 
because Congress’s power to regulate federal elections under the Elections 
Clause is “paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent 
which it deems expedient.”145  In Vieth v. Jubelirer,146  Justice Scalia, writing 
for a plurality that included Justice Clarence Thomas, reiterated his view of 
a far-reaching power under the Elections Clause, holding that the Elections 
Clause gives Congress the power to create a complete code for federal 
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elections, including the authority to regulate redistricting and prevent 
partisan gerrymandering.147 
Justice Scalia’s contemporary view of an extensive Elections Clause 
power is consistent with the Court’s historical interpretation of the Elections 
Clause.148  In Smiley v. Holm,149 the Court interpreted the “Times, Places and 
Manner” of elections broadly to include all policies necessary “to enact the 
numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience 
shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved.”150  
Specifically, the Court held that Congress’s power under the Elections 
Clause includes the authority to enact a “complete code” for federal elections 
and that this code can include laws related to “notices, registration, 
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt 
practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making 
and publication of election returns.”151 
The Court’s Elections Clause jurisprudence has also reinforced the 
proposition that Congress’s power to regulate federal elections is an essential 
plenary authority over the states.152  Finally, the Court has also held that the 
Elections Clause is unique in the power it affords Congress to displace state 
law and that this power essentially functions as a congressional veto, to be 
used at Congress’s discretion, over state election laws.153  For example, in 
Foster v. Love,154 the Court explained that it is “well settled” that Congress 
has the authority under the Elections Clause to “override state regulations” 
by creating comprehensive rules for federal elections that are binding on the 
states.155 
Constitutional sources of congressional legislative power are typically 
limited by federalism constraints, such as the anticommandeering principle 
and the Court’s preemption doctrine.156  However, the Court has held that 
Congress’s legislative power under the Elections Clause is not limited by 
these standard federalism constraints.157  For example, in Inter Tribal, Justice 
Scalia held that the Court’s preemption doctrine—which protects state 
sovereignty by presuming that Congress does not intend to preempt state law 
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unless it says so clearly—does not apply to legislation enacted under the 
Elections Clause.158  Justice Scalia explained that the Elections Clause was 
designed to allow Congress to preempt state law as “the power the Elections 
Clause confers is none other than the power to pre-empt.”159 
Lower federal courts have also interpreted the Elections Clause as granting 
Congress broad authority to preempt state law in order to regulate federal 
elections.160  In cases challenging the constitutionality of the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), lower courts consistently held that 
Congress’s Elections Clause authority exceeds its Commerce Clause 
authority, which is limited by standard federalism constraints.161  For 
example, in Ass’n of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. 
Edgar,162 the Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that Congress could not 
force Illinois to administer the NVRA.163  In support of the court’s decision, 
Judge Richard Posner explained that, in the context of the Elections Clause, 
“Congress was given the whip hand” to enact federal election legislation and 
compel states to administer its provisions.164 
3.  Legislative Proposals 
Congress has made several attempts to use its far-reaching “whip hand” 
authority under the Elections Clause to address partisan gerrymandering.165  
In 2010, congressional Democrats introduced the Congressional 
Redistricting Formula Act, which would have required states to follow 
redistricting standards of compactness, contiguity, and respect for political 
subdivisions.166  The Act also would have prohibited the establishment of 
congressional districts that were drawn “with the major purpose of diluting 
the voting strength of any person, or group, including any political party,” 
except when necessary to comply with the VRA.167 
Another example of proposed federal anti-gerrymandering legislation is 
the Fairness and Independence in Redistricting Act of 2005.168  This bill 
would require every state to establish an IRC to adopt redistricting plans.169  
 
 158. Inter Tribal, 570 U.S. at 14–15. 
 159. Id. at 14. 
 160. See, e.g., United States v. Slone, 411 F.3d 643, 648–50 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding a 
federal statute criminalizing vote-buying based on the broad powers conferred by the Elections 
Clause). 
 161. See Harkless v. Brunner, 545 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing Congress’s 
broad powers pursuant to the Elections Clause from its more limited powers under the 
Commerce Clause); Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 
836–37 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that unlike the Spending Clause, the Elections Clause explicitly 
grants Congress the power to force states to adopt federal regulations). 
 162. 56 F.3d 791 (1995). 
 163. Id. at 794. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See, e.g., H.R. 1, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 6250, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2010); H.R. 
2642, 109th Cong. § 3(a) (2005). 
 166. H.R. 6250 § 2(b). 
 167. Id. 
 168. H.R. 2642. 
 169. Id. § 3(a). 
2106 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
The bill also set forth criteria for IRCs to use, such as compactness, 
contiguity, and population equality, and prohibited consideration of voting 
history, political party affiliation, or incumbent representative’s residence.170 
Most recently, congressional Democrats introduced the For the People Act 
of 2019.171  Among other things, the bill would require states to adopt fifteen-
member IRCs that would draw congressional districts and establish certain 
redistricting criteria, including the protection of communities of interest.172  
On March 8, 2019, the House of Representatives passed the bill along 
partisan lines.173  However, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell has 
indicated that he will not allow a vote on the bill, effectively killing the bill’s 
chances of becoming law.174 
Partisan gerrymandering and electoral reform have also been important 
issues in the 2020 Democratic Party presidential primaries, with several 
candidates already releasing plans to combat gerrymandering.175  For 
example, Democratic presidential candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren 
released a plan that would require states to use IRCs to draw federal 
congressional districts and provide monetary incentives for states to use IRCs 
to draw state congressional districts.176 
As noted by Justice Elena Kagan in her Rucho dissent, what all of these 
proposals have in common is that they are merely proposals, not laws.177  
Because politicians who benefit from partisan gerrymandering “maintain 
themselves in office through partisan gerrymandering, the chances for 
legislative reform are slight.”178  However, the House’s recent ability to pass 
the For the People Act of 2019 suggests that the political barriers to enacting 
a federal anti-gerrymandering law may not be so steep.  Furthermore, unlike 
the creation of state IRCs by direct referendum, the creation of IRCs by 
congressional anti-gerrymandering legislation is on far more solid 
constitutional ground because Congress has a unique repository of power to 
regulate federal elections under the Elections Clause.179 
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III.  A PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE REDISTRICTING REFORM 
This Part argues that congressional legislation is the only pathway to 
achieve comprehensive and nationwide redistricting reform.  Citing the 
Elections Clause’s unique place in the constitutional scheme, as well as the 
lack of alternatives at the state level, Part III.A argues that Congress’s 
authority to enact anti-gerrymandering legislation is likely the only 
remaining hope for comprehensive redistricting reform.  This Part also 
argues that Congress should use its far-reaching authority under the Elections 
Clause to enact legislation that requires states to adopt IRCs for congressional 
redistricting.  Part III.B discusses the federalism concerns that would result 
from this type of legislation and argues that the flexible and diverse criteria 
of IRCs can help alleviate these federalism concerns by giving states wide 
discretion in choosing their own versions of what constitutes a “fair” map. 
A.  Congressional Legislation as the Last Hope for Redistricting Reform 
Partisan gerrymandering poses a fundamental threat to American 
democracy.180  Entrenching partisan power through partisan gerrymandering 
corrodes democracy by decreasing competitive elections, permitting the 
election of representatives that are unrepresentative of the electorate, and 
diluting the franchise of a large number of voters solely because of their party 
affiliation.181  These concerns are more pressing than ever after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Rucho, which declared partisan gerrymandering to be a 
nonjusticiable political question and effectively foreclosed the federal 
judiciary as an avenue for achieving redistricting reform.182  Despite some 
limited successes, state courts are also unlikely to be an avenue for 
comprehensive redistricting reform.183  Some states, particularly those that 
have created IRCs through direct voter referendums, have been able to 
mitigate the democratic harms imposed by partisan gerrymandering by 
removing elected representatives from the redistricting process.184  However, 
as discussed above, the creation of IRCs at the state level faces constitutional 
and political barriers that would likely prevent systemic redistricting 
reform.185 
So what options are left for reformers seeking to end the pervasive practice 
of partisan gerrymandering in U.S. politics?  Congress’s authority under the 
Elections Clause is the last hope for comprehensive redistricting reform.  
Federal legislation that compels states to adopt IRCs for federal elections 
would help promote fair representation at a national level by removing self-
interested elected representatives from the redistricting process.186  
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Furthermore, unlike for state-level remedies, there is a strong constitutional 
basis for this type of federal action.187  During the Constitution’s ratification 
debates, the founders envisioned that the Elections Clause would provide 
Congress with a necessary tool to prevent the states from unfairly 
manipulating the electoral process through practices like extreme partisan 
gerrymandering.188  Finally, the founders’ view of Congress having a far-
reaching plenary power over the states to prevent unfair manipulation of the 
electoral process has been reaffirmed by over one hundred years of Elections 
Clause jurisprudence.189 
The Elections Clause is not only an affirmative grant of power to the 
federal government that allows Congress to legislate irrespective of state 
sovereignty but also one that empowers Congress to aggressively police state 
action to protect the fundamental right to vote.190  The Court has held that 
Congress’s Elections Clause authority is neither constrained by the 
preemption doctrine nor limited by the anticommandeering principle, which 
prevents the federal government from commandeering state officers to 
administer federal law.191  The Elections Clause empowers Congress to 
“conscripts state agencies” to carry out its election priorities and it “explicitly 
grants Congress the authority to force states to alter their regulations 
regarding federal regulations.”192  Given the Elections Clause’s unique place 
in the constitutional scheme, as well as the lack of better alternatives at the 
state level, Congress’s authority under the Elections Clause is likely the only 
remaining hope for comprehensive redistricting reform. 
B.  Federalism Concerns and a Legislative Compromise 
The drawing of electoral districts has historically been a core function of 
state government.193  Therefore, while federal legislation that requires state 
adoption of IRCs has the strong potential to serve as a comprehensive remedy 
for partisan gerrymandering, it also poses potential federalism concerns as 
this proposed legislation would constitute a significant shift of power from 
the states to the federal government.  In response to the passage of the For 
the People Act of 2019 in the House of Representatives, the Heritage 
Foundation, a conservative think tank, released a report arguing that 
legislation that requires states to adopt IRCs is unconstitutional because it 
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redistricting.194  Indeed, given that the Court’s expanded Eleventh 
Amendment jurisprudence carves out a protected zone for state power under 
the Commerce Clause,195 there is a possibility that the current Supreme Court 
could break with long-standing Elections Clause precedent and strike down 
federal legislation requiring states to adopt IRCs. 
However, these federalism concerns can be partially alleviated by allowing 
states to have significant discretion in the mandates that they give to their 
respective IRCs.  State IRCs currently use a number of different approaches 
and criteria to guide IRC members during the map-drawing process.196  For 
example, states like California prioritize nonpartisan political considerations, 
like creating regularly shaped districts and preserving local communities of 
interest.197  Other state IRCs, like the recently approved IRC in Missouri, 
prioritize certain political outcomes, such as competitive elections and 
proportional representation.198  Legislation that requires states to adopt IRCs, 
while also permitting states to choose their own redistricting criteria, would 
allow states to continue to have a substantive role in the redistricting process.  
This kind of legislative compromise could alleviate federalism concerns 
without compromising the independent nature of IRCs that makes IRCs an 
effective remedy for partisan gerrymandering. 
CONCLUSION 
While Rucho dealt a major blow to redistricting activists, the Court’s 
decision did not “condemn complaints about districting to echo into a 
void.”199  Nonetheless, with the Court foreclosing partisan gerrymandering 
claims from the federal judiciary and with only limited state-level 
redistricting remedies available, redistricting advocates have a difficult task 
ahead.  Despite these barriers, there still remains a pathway to achieve 
comprehensive redistricting reform. 
This Note proposes that Congress should exercise its far-reaching 
Elections Clause power to enact national legislation that compels states to 
adopt IRCs for federal elections, while allowing states to choose their own 
redistricting criteria to guide their respective IRCs.  Calling for states to 
continue to have a substantive role in the redistricting process can alleviate 
federalism concerns, while also strengthening American democracy and 
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promoting fair representation at a national level by removing self-interested 
elected representatives from the redistricting process. 
